# IV

## POLITICS AND WAR

MUSLIMS, like Christians, governed and made war; like them too, they managed to involve their religion in both activities. But in the manner and nature of the two involvements there were great differences. The Founder of Christianity bade his followers 'render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's'—and for three centuries Christianity grew as a religion of the oppressed, until Caesar himself became a Christian, and initiated the processes by which the Church became involved in the State, and the State in the Church. The Founder of Islam was his own Constantine. During his lifetime, the Muslims became a political as well as a religious community, with the Prophet as sovereign—governing a place and a people, dispensing justice, collecting taxes, commanding armies, conducting diplomacy, and waging war. For the early generations of Muslims, there was no long testing by persecution, no apprenticeship in resistance to an alien and hostile state power. On the contrary, the state was their own, and the divine favour manifested itself to them in this world in the form of success, victory, and empire.

For Muḥammad and his companions, therefore, the choice between God and Caesar, the snare in which not Christ but so many Christians were to be entangled, did not arise. In Islam, there was no Caesar, there was only God, and Muḥammad was His Prophet, who both taught and ruled on His behalf. The same authority, from the same source, sustained the Prophet in both tasks; the same revelation provided the content of the one, and the basis of the other. When Muḥammad died, his spiritual and prophetic function—the promulgation of God's message—was completed; his religious, and with it his political work remained. This was to spread the law of God among mankind, by extending

the membership and authority of the community which recognized and upheld that law. In the leadership of this community, a deputy or successor to the Prophet was needed. The Arabic word *khalīfa*, by which that successor was known, combined the two meanings.

In its origins, the great Islamic institution of the Caliphate was an improvisation. The death of the Prophet, with no succession arranged, precipitated a crisis in the infant Muslim community. There was grave danger that the community might disintegrate into its component parts—the tribes choose new tribal chiefs and revert to tribal custom, the word of God be lost and forgotten. Thanks to the swift and resolute action of a few of the Prophet's closest associates, this danger was averted. A new leader was chosen and accepted, and under his rule and that of his successors, the community of Muḥammad grew by conquest and conversion into a world religion and a universal empire. To the early Muslims, it must have seemed that it was only a matter of time—and not a very long time—before the whole world and all mankind were brought into that community.

The Arabic word used to designate the community is *umma*, probably borrowed from the Hebrew *ummāh*, nation. In classical Arabic it is used of both ethnic and religious entities, and even of groups of men linked by some common quality or attribute. It occurs frequently in the Koran, where it is applied to the Christians, the good Christians, the Jews, the Arabs, and the virtuous, as well as to the followers of the Prophet. In a contemporary document preserved in the traditional biography of Muḥammad, the community of Medina is described as *umma dūn al-nās*—a community apart or distinct from (other) men.

From the start, the Islamic *umma* had a dual character. On the one hand it was a political society—a chieftaincy which swiftly grew into a state and then an empire; on the other it was a religious community, founded by a Prophet and ruled by his deputy. In its origins, it followed the only acceptable political model, that of the Arabian tribe or tribal confederacy. Already during the life-

time of Muḥammad, this model underwent important changes, both of content and of emphasis. Under the rule of the Caliphs these changes were vastly extended and accelerated. The Caliphate was a polity defined by Islam. Religion replaced kinship as the ultimate basis of corporate identity and loyalty; it either supplanted or sanctified custom as the law of the community. While the tribal sheikh presided by the voluntary and revocable consent of the tribe, Muḥammad came to rule by absolute spiritual prerogative, deriving his authority not from the governed but from God. The Caliphs did not claim to inherit the spiritual functions and privileges of prophethood; they were, however, the religious heirs of the Prophet, as heads of the *umma* which he had founded, with the same task of upholding the law of God and bringing it to all mankind. As formulated by the great jurists of Islam, the law itself requires and regulates the office of the Caliphate, which is necessary for the propagation of Islam and the well-being of the Muslims (see further on the *umma* below, Chapter IX (*B*), p. 405).

In recent years it has become fashionable to distinguish between the 'governing institution' and the 'religious institution' in Islam. Whatever relevance this distinction may have to the later Islamic Empires—and even this has been questioned—it has none to early Islam. In the classical Caliphate, government *is* the religious institution, and there is no other. The Germanic invaders of the West found a state and a religion, the Roman Empire and the Christian Church, which had grown along different lines from diverse origins, each retaining its own institutions, hierarchy, and law. The invaders recognized and accepted both, giving expression to their own aims and needs within the dual structure of Roman and Christian polity. The Arab invaders of the Middle East and North Africa brought their own faith and created their own polity, in which Church and State were one and the same, with the Caliph as supreme head. Such pairs of words as religious and secular, spiritual and temporal, clergy and laity, even sacred and profane, had no real equivalents in Islamic usage until much

later times, when new terms were devised for new concepts; in classical Islam the dichotomy which these terms denote was unknown and therefore unexpressed. It is sometimes said that the Caliph was pope and emperor in one. The analogy is misleading. The Caliph had no pontifical or even priestly functions, and did not receive the professional training of the men of religion, the *ulema*. His duty was not to expound, still less to interpret the faith, but to uphold and protect it, and to create and maintain conditions in which men could live the good Muslim life in this world, and thus prepare themselves for the world to come. To accomplish this, he had to preserve law and order within the frontiers of Islam, and defend those frontiers against external attack. Where possible, it was his duty to extend those frontiers, until in the fullness of time the whole world was gained for Islam.

The Caliph had various titles. As head of the faith, he was the *Imām*—the leader, and therefore, *par excellence*, the leader in prayer—of the Muslims. This is the term preferred by theologians and jurists when discussing his office. As head of state, he was the *Amir al-Mu'minin*, conventionally translated Commander of the Faithful. It was by this title, denoting political and military authority, that he was normally designated in official usage. The title *khalīfa* was also frequent in official usage, and, with its abstract equivalent *khilāfa*, caliphate, is the term most commonly used by historians.

In early usage, the Caliph was *khalīfat rasūl Allāh*, the deputy of the Prophet of God; in later times he was often known by the briefer and more powerful formula *khalīfat Allāh*, deputy of God. Despite the disapproval of the jurists, this title was widely, if informally, used. It is very striking that where Western polities speak of the city, crown, state, or people, classical Islam named God as the ultimate repository of authority. The community was God's community, *ummat Allāh*; its property was God's property, *māl Allāh*; its officials, army, even booty, were similarly ascribed. Its enemies, naturally, were God's enemies, *'aduww Allāh*.[1]

[1] D. Santillana, *Istituzioni di diritto musulmano*, i (Rome, 1925), 4, n. 23.

So central an institution as the Caliphate inevitably received a good deal of attention from Muslim scholars and thinkers. In Islam as elsewhere, there were men who sought to observe and define the nature of political authority, and to regulate its exercise. In the West, these tasks have been variously discharged by theologians, philosophers, politicians, constitutional lawyers, and social scientists. In the Islamic world, a somewhat different classification is required. By far the most important body of Muslim writers on the State is that of the Sunnī jurists whose approach, given the nature of Muslim theology and law, is theological and legal at one and the same time. Their starting-point is God's concern for man and intervention in human affairs. Though man is a political animal, he is by nature warlike and destructive, and is incapable by himself of attaining to a knowledge of the good or achieving an orderly social existence. These deficiencies are remedied by revelation and divine law. To uphold and apply the law, a supreme ruler is required, whose office is thus part of the divine plan for mankind. This is the Caliph, or, to use the term favoured in juristic and theological writings, the Imām. The appointment of such a ruler, and obedience to him once appointed, are an obligation of the Muslim community—a religious obligation, failure in which is a sin as well as a crime. As there is only one God and only one divine law, so there must be only one supreme ruler on earth, to represent God and enforce the law.

The schools differed on who should be Caliph and how he should be chosen. There was general agreement that the Caliph must be adult, male, and free, sound of mind, body, and character, wise and courageous, and that he must have a sufficient knowledge of the divine law. Sunnīs and Shīʿīs agreed that he must be of the kin of the Prophet, but differed in their definition of this requirement. For the Sunnīs, it was sufficient that he should be of Quraysh, the Arab tribe to which the Prophet had belonged; for the Shīʿīs, the definition was gradually narrowed to the clan of the Prophet, then his family, and finally his direct descendants through his daughter Fāṭima.

A more important difference arose over the manner of selection. The Shīʿīs came to adopt the doctrine that the Imām held office by divine appointment. Not only therefore could there be only one Imām in the world; there could only be one rightful candidate for the succession at any one time, who would normally be made known by his predecessor. The Sunnī jurists adopted the principle of election, in a form drawn from the procedure by which an Arabian tribe acquired a new chief. Any candidate who met the conditions of eligibility could be elected. The electors were not of course the whole body of Muslims, but those who by virtue of their position and qualities were able to perform this task—in other words, the dignitaries and notables of the community. The composition and numbers of the electorate were never authoritatively defined, nor was the procedure of the election. Some required the concurrence of all competent electors—but without defining their competence; others were content with a quorum of five, three, two, or even one elector. The one elector might be the reigning Caliph, who could thus nominate his successor. The elector or electors, on behalf of the *umma*, offer the Caliphate to the candidate, in accordance with the provisions of the law; the candidate's acceptance constitutes a binding legal contract. The contract is sealed by the *bayʿa*, the giving and taking of homage, symbolized in a handshake. The Caliph is bound to uphold the law and safeguard the *umma*; the subjects are bound to obey the Caliph, and to help him in these tasks. The contract is dissolved or suspended if the Caliph becomes physically or morally unable to carry out his obligations, or seeks to impose what is contrary to the faith and law of Islam. This last point is expressed in two well-known sayings, attributed to the Prophet: 'There is no [duty of] obedience in sin', and 'Do not obey a creature against the Creator'.

Such was the theory; the practice was lamentably different. The first four Caliphs, sanctified by Muslim tradition as the righteous rulers, did indeed emerge from the Muslim élite on a non-hereditary basis, by processes which might be described as electoral in the Sunnī legal sense; but three of the four reigns

were ended by murder, the last two amid civil war. Thereafter the Caliphate in effect became hereditary in two successive dynasties, the Umayyads and the ʿAbbāsids, whose system and style of government owed rather more to the autocratic empires of antiquity than to the patriarchal community of Medina. The subject's duty of obedience remained, and was indeed reinforced; the Caliph's obligation to meet the requirements of eligibility and fulfil the conditions of incumbency was emptied of most of its content.

This disparity between theory and practice—between the noble precepts of the law and the brutal facts of government—has led some scholars to dismiss the whole political and constitutional system of the classical Muslim jurists as an abstract and artificial construction, as little related to reality as the civil liberties enshrined in the constitutions of modern dictatorships. The comparison is exaggerated and unjust. The great jurists of medieval Islam were neither stupid nor corrupt—neither ignorant of reality, nor suborned to defend it. On the contrary, they were moved by a profound religious concern, arising precisely from their awareness of the gap between the ideals of Islam and the practice of Muslim states. The problem of the juristic writers on Muslim government was deeper than that posed by the conduct of one or another individual ruler. It concerned the direction taken by Muslim society as a whole since the days of the Prophet—a direction that had led it very far from the ethical and political ideas of prophetic Islam. Yet to impugn the validity of the system of government under which the Muslims lived was to impugn the orthodoxy of the Islamic *umma*, a position unacceptable to the Sunnī *ulema*, whose very definition of orthodoxy rested on the precedent and practice of the community. The jurist was thus obliged, in some measure, to justify the existing order, so as to vindicate the Sunnī faith and system against the charge that they had gone astray and had led the Muslims into a state of sin.

But, if the Sunnī *ulema* were powerless to change the realities of politics, they were equally unable to change the basis of their

political thought. For them, the origins and functioning of the state were not matters for philosophical speculation, for Utopian fantasies, nor even, primarily, for practical observation—though all these exercises had their adepts in the world of Islam; for the *ulema*, they were part of the law, that is, of the God-given holy law of Islam, which could be neither abrogated nor amended by man on earth.

It could, however, be interpreted, and in this way the jurists were able to achieve some accommodation between theory and practice. In traditional Islamic states, the men of religion still shared a common universe of discourse with rulers. While on the one hand they used what influence they had to bring the practice of rulers nearer to the ideals of Islam, on the other they sought, by interpretative ingenuity, to insert existing practice, suitably disguised, into their expositions of the law of God. The Caliphate was elective, but the Caliph could be nominated by his predecessor; the Caliph was the sole supreme sovereign of all Islam, but ministers or governors might acquire and hold office by 'seizure', and an 'established band of rebels' could exercise legally valid authority, both as rulers and as belligerents. In this way the jurists were able to admit the hard facts that the Caliphate had become a dynastic monarchy, that the Caliph was often a mere puppet, and that the political unity of Islam had given way to a multiplicity of separate, sometimes conflicting sovereign states, in which the Caliphate itself was finally submerged. Successive jurists made further accommodations with a deteriorating reality, until finally the whole system of juristic constitutional theory was tacitly abandoned, and a new approach devised, based on the principle that any effective authority, however obtained and however exercised, was better than unrestrained private violence. 'Tyranny is better than anarchy', became a favourite theme of the jurists. 'Whose power prevails, must be obeyed.' The only requirements were the possession of effective military power and, in the broadest terms, respect for Islam. By this time, the contribution of the men of religion to political thought amounts to little more than

conventional piety and exhortation; the more interesting expositions came from philosophers, historians, men of letters, and men of affairs.

There was much for them to observe and discuss, for great changes had taken place in the Islamic polity. The elective Caliphate lasted for barely thirty years, from the death of the Prophet and accession of Abū Bakr in 632 to the murder of ʿAlī and recognition of Muʿāwiya in 661. To solve the obviously acute problem of succession and continuity, Muʿāwiya nominated his son Yazīd as successor-designate, and persuaded the Arab leaders to accept this nomination. In this way he initiated the process by which the Caliphate in fact, though never in theory, became hereditary in a single family. The elective principle remained strong enough to prevent the emergence of any recognized rule of dynastic succession. Instead, it remained the practice, under the ʿAbbāsids as well as the Umayyads, for the reigning Caliph to nominate one of his sons or kinsmen as successor, and obtain promises of allegiance to him. Often a Caliph would nominate two or more heirs to reign successively. Such attempts to regulate the future were rarely successful, and sometimes disastrous. In later times, when the Caliphs fell under the control of their ministers and generals, it was these who appointed and replaced their sovereigns at will, in accordance with their own purposes and rivalries.

These changes in the nature of the Caliphate and of the Islamic polity were neither unnoticed nor unresisted. The Umayyads, though generally accepted by the Muslims, had to face opposition from two important quarters, both of which challenged their title to the Caliphate. On the one hand were the Khārijīs, who rejected both the monarchical and hereditary principles. For them, the head of the *umma* should be freely chosen by the Muslims, and should remain head only for as long as they wished him to. There was to be no restriction of eligibility by descent or by status, but only by worth. To the Sunnī doctrine that the Caliph had to be a free man and an Arab of Quraysh, the Khārijīs retorted that any man,

of whatever status or origin, could be Caliph, if he obtained and retained the consent of the believers.

At the opposite extreme were the Shīʿīs, who agreed that the Caliph should be a free Arab of Quraysh, but insisted that he must be of the clan of the Prophet. This narrower definition excluded the Umayyads, but admitted the ʿAbbāsids, who eventually succeeded in wresting the Caliphate from them. The Shīʿī opposition to ʿAbbāsid rule thereupon defined their claims even more narrowly, and in effect restricted them to the direct descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭima and his cousin and son-in-law ʿAlī.

Despite these and other opposition movements, the principle of unity—of a single Caliphate embracing all Islam—was for long maintained intact. In patriarchal and Umayyad times, the Caliph was indeed the sole sovereign in all the lands which the Muslims had conquered, and local governors and commanders were appointed and dismissed by him. The first permanent infringement of the unity of the Caliphate came in 756, when an Umayyad prince, who had fled from the ruin of his family in the East, became ruler of Muslim Spain in defiance of the ʿAbbāsids, repelled an attack by ʿAbbāsid forces, and set up what became an independent emirate, outside the Eastern Caliphal Empire.

The process of political fragmentation continued rapidly. It began, naturally enough, at the extremities, and soon spread towards the centre. After Spain, Morocco and Tunisia fell to independent dynasties (late eighth to early ninth centuries); others appeared in eastern Iran (late ninth to early tenth centuries). Finally, Egypt, Syria, Arabia, and even parts of Iraq were by the middle of the tenth century lost to the imperial government, which retained effective control of little more than the capital and the province surrounding it. In time, even these ceased to be ruled by the Caliphs, who became the helpless puppets of their own military commanders.

These independent dynasties were of varying origins. Some—usually the smaller and weaker among them—were of local origin;

sometimes such principalities were founded by members of the landed nobility or gentry, more frequently by tribal chieftains, occasionally even by brigands and other outlaws. More commonly, the founders of dynasties were officers or soldiers of fortune, who were appointed to the governorship of a province, and in due course succeeded in making their governorship first autonomous and then hereditary. In Iran, such governors were often Iranian by origin or assimilation, and their regimes, drawing on local loyalties, were associated with a revival of Iranian political, social, and cultural traditions. Elsewhere, the dynasts were usually aliens, at first Arabs, later Turks; their regencies, even when beneficent, rested on a foreign soldiery rather than on any real local support, and were accompanied by no comparable revival.

The Umayyad emirs of Spain founded their state in defiance of the Caliphate, and remained outside it. Elsewhere, the ruling princes of the Empire were content with the reality of independence, and did not insist on the form. For the most part they were willing, even anxious, to recognize the titular supremacy of the Caliph as head of all Islam, and to obtain a diploma of appointment from him in return. In time, the Caliph came to be a sort of legitimating authority, whose recognition gave formal legal validity to sovereignties established by the less formal procedures of rebellion, usurpation, and war. The real content of Caliphal suzerainty over such rulers varied with personal and political factors; it was usually small.

Often, an independent principality might be established in direct defiance of central authority. When such a regime survived, its rulers usually managed to reach some accommodation with the Caliph and his regents. There were, however, exceptions. Rebels inspired by Shīʿī or Khāriji ideas not only rejected the authority of the Caliph in their region, but impugned his title to the Caliphate itself. For such the question of mutual formal recognition could hardly arise, though some measure of tacit mutual toleration was not unknown. With one great exception, such technically rebel regimes survived only in remote and in-

accessible regions, and offered no serious threat to the nominal political unity and substantial social unity of the Islamic world under the Sunnī Caliphate.

That one exception was the Fāṭimid dynasty, whose enthronement in Tunisia in 909 marked the victory of the second great revolutionary movement in medieval Islam, after that which had brought the ʿAbbāsids to power a century and a half earlier. The Fāṭimids were something different from the local leaders, mutinous soldiers, and ambitious governors who were founding dynasties in east and west. They were the heads of a major religious schism in Islam, that of the Ismāʿīlī Shīʿa; as such, they refused to submit even to the titular suzerainty of the ʿAbbāsids, whom they denounced as usurpers. By inheritance and by God's choice, so they said, they were the Imāms—the sole rightful claimants to the universal Caliphate. It was their intention, by conquest and conversion, to win all Islam to their cause, and overthrow the ʿAbbāsids as the ʿAbbāsids had overthrown the Umayyads.

They came remarkably near to succeeding in this objective. After ruling in North Africa for half a century, they moved eastwards, and in 969 conquered Egypt, where they built a new capital, the city of Cairo. From Egypt they extended their power to Palestine, Syria, western and southern Arabia, and even, for a brief interval in 1057–9, to Mosul and to Baghdad itself. This was the high-water mark of their Empire, which thereafter dwindled and declined, until the Fāṭimid Caliphate was finally terminated in 1171 and Egypt restored by Saladin to ʿAbbāsid suzerainty and Sunnī orthodoxy.

During the tenth and eleventh centuries, the prospects of Sunnī Islam and of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate must have seemed very insecure. The rival and schismatic Fāṭimid Caliphate ruled half the Islamic world, and offered a major threat, both religious and political, to the remainder. Even within the ʿAbbāsid domains, the Shīʿa were flourishing, with growing influence both in the world of ideas and in the seats of power. For a while, the Caliphs themselves were dominated by a dynasty of Persian Shīʿī mayors

of the palace. In the far West, the Umayyad emir of Cordova, confronted with the unprecedented spectacle of two Caliphs—a schismatic one in Tunisia, and an orthodox one far away in Baghdad—sought to protect himself from Fāṭimid subversion by proclaiming his own Caliphate, in 929. Thereafter there were for a while three Caliphs in Islam. The collapse of the Cordova Caliphate in 1031 again reduced the number to two and the extinction of the Fāṭimids in 1171 to one—the ʿAbbāsid in Baghdad. The principle of unity had been restored.

In this restoration several factors were at work. One was the internal decline and disunity of the Fāṭimid state and faith; another was the emergence of a new political and military order in the East, under the aegis of the Turkish Sultans.

These represent the culmination of a new form of sovereignty in Islam. During the ninth century, the rule of the emirs—provincial governors in theory, independent dynastic rulers in effect—became an accepted part of the pattern of Islamic government. It was given formal legitimacy by the practice whereby the ruler made token submission to the Caliph, who in return gave him a diploma of appointment—in effect a licence to rule. The fee for such a licence became increasingly modest. In time the Caliph ceased to exercise any real power even in his own capital, where effective political authority passed into the hands of a succession of military commanders. In 935 the position was regularized, when the emir of the capital assumed the title *amīr al-umarāʾ* (emir of emirs), to indicate his primacy among the princes of the Empire. The same title was adopted in 946 by the Persian Būyids, the new masters of Baghdad and Iraq. In their hands, it came to be a title of imperial sovereignty, distinct from the Caliphate and in most practical respects superior to it. Significantly, the Būyids also revived the old Persian title *Shāhanshāh*, 'King of Kings', and used it together with its Arabic equivalent *malik al-mulūk*. If the masters of the provinces were kings, the master of the capital was a king of kings.

From the provinces to the centre a new system of imperial

authority was emerging, associated with that of the Caliph, but with a prior right in political and military affairs. The process was completed in the middle of the eleventh century, with the establishment of the dominion of the Seljuq Turks over most of southwestern Asia, and the creation by them of the Sultanate.

The Arabic word *sulṭān* is an abstract noun meaning authority or rule, and was used from early times to denote the government. In a society where state and ruler are more or less synonymous terms, it came to be applied to the holder, as well as to the function, of political authority, and was used, informally, of ministers, governors, and other rulers—even, on occasion, of the Caliphs themselves, Fāṭimid as well as ʿAbbāsid. By the tenth century it had become a common designation of independent rulers, which served to distinguish them from those who were still appointed and dismissed by a superior power. Its use, however, remained informal; while it occurs frequently in literary sources, in letters, for example, and poetic eulogies, it has not yet been encountered in the more formal usage of coins and inscriptions. It first became official in the eleventh century, when it was adopted by the Seljuqs as their chief regnal title. In Seljuq protocol, the word Sultan acquires a new sense, and embodies a new claim—no less than the supreme political sovereignty of all Islam, parallel and at least equal to the religious primacy of the Caliph.

On the whole, the Caliphs fared rather better under the Great Seljuq Sultans than under the Shīʿī Būyid *amīr al-umarāʾ*. The Seljuqs were devout Sunnīs, with a sense of religious and imperial mission. They did not, like the Būyids, depose the Caliphs at will; on the contrary, they treated them and their office with respect. But they were equally firm in reserving all real power to themselves, and far more explicit in asserting their right to do so. The Seljuq point of view is clearly expressed in a letter of 1133 from Sultan Sanjar to the Caliph's vizier: 'We received from the lord of the world . . . the kingship of the world, and we received this by right and inheritance, and from the father and grandfather of

the Commander of the Faithful . . . we have a standard and a covenant.'[1]

Sovereignty, in other words, belongs to the house of Seljuq. It is given by God and ratified by the Caliph as religious authority. Like the Caliphate, the Sultanate was unique and universal. As there was only one Caliph, as religious head of the Islamic community, so there could be only one Sultan, who was responsible for the order, security, and government of the Islamic Empire. This division of authority between Caliphate and Sultanate became so well established that when, during a period of Seljuq weakness, a Caliph attempted to exercise independent political power, the Sultan and his spokesman protested against what they now regarded as an infringement of Sultanic prerogatives. The Caliph, they said, should busy himself with his duties as Imām, as leader in prayer, which is the best and most glorious of tasks and the protection of the rulers of the world; he should leave the business of government to the Sultans to whom it was entrusted.[2]

The emergence of a dual sovereignty did not escape the attention of writers on politics and statecraft. The awareness of change is naturally clearest in the writings of those whose acquaintance with politics was practical, chiefly bureaucratic; it can, however, also be detected in the works of theologians and even of jurists. For Muslim thinkers, the basic division was not the familiar Western one between religious and secular. The Sultanate too was conceived as a religious institution, maintained by and maintaining the Holy Law, and the relations between the state and the professional men of religion became much closer under the Seljuq Sultans and their successors than they had ever been under the rule of the Caliphs. As expressed in Muslim, and especially Persian

[1] Cited by Ann K. S. Lambton, 'Quis custodiet custodes: Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government', *Studia Islamica*, v (1956), 129–30; the original of the letter was published in 'Abbās Eghbāl, *Vizārat dar 'ahd-i salāṭīn-i buzurg-i Saljūqī* (Tehran, 1959), pp. 302ff.

[2] Ibn al-Rāwandi, *Rāḥat al-Ṣudūr*, ed. Muh. Iqbal (Leiden, 1921), p. 334; cf. W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion* (3rd edn., London, 1968), pp. 346–7.

writings, the real distinction is between two kinds of authority, the one prophetic, the other monarchical. 'Know', says an eleventh-century Persian author, 'that the lord most high has given one power to prophets and another to kings; and He has made it incumbent upon the people of the earth that they should submit themselves to the two powers and should acknowledge the true way laid down by God.'[1] The Prophet is chosen and sent by God, and his task is to promulgate and establish God's law. The polity which he establishes is a divine one. Human polity, however, must be ruled by a monarch, who obtains and preserves his authority by political and military means. Possession of this authority confers on him the right to give orders and to punish transgressors, independently of—though not contrary to—the law of God. If he knows the law of God and administers it justly, then his authority is sanctified by God, and he and his subjects qualify for the 'two felicities', of this world and the next. There is no need for a Prophet in every age, and there has been none since Muḥammad, but there must always be a monarch, for without a monarch order would give way to anarchy. The relationship between religious orthodoxy and political stability was well understood and frequently expressed. It is summed up in a dictum often cited by Muslim authors, sometimes as a piece of old Persian wisdom, sometimes as a saying of the Prophet: 'Islam (or religion) and government are twin brothers; one cannot thrive without the other. Islam is the foundation and government the guardian. What has no foundation, collapses; what has no guardian, perishes.'[2]

The Seljuqs and later Sultans insisted strongly on their role as the upholders of the faith and the law, and on the consequent divine sanction for their sovereign authority. Even some part of the prophetic authority, according to some authors, could thus be claimed

[1] Bayhaqi, *Tārikh-i Bayhaqi*, edd. Qāsim Ghanī and ʿAlī Akbar Fayyāḍ (Tehran, 1324/1946), p. 99. Translation in C. E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids* (Edinburgh, 1963), p. 63.

[2] See, for example, I. Goldziher, *Streitschrift des Gazālī gegen die Bāṭinijja-Sekte* (Leiden, 1916), pp. 101–2.

by a righteous Sultan. In general, however, the prophetic authority resided in the Holy Law, and therefore also to some extent in the *ulema* as custodians of that law. Thus the *qāḍī*s, as judges administering the Holy Law, were designated as deputies (*nā'ib*s) of the Prophet. But there were other courts and other judges, enforcing the Sultan's orders, and punishing those who disobeyed them; and even the qāḍīs were nominated not by the Caliph, but by the Sultan, who alone, as the holder of real power, could make an effective and therefore valid appointment. In the same way and for the same reason the Sultan would choose and appoint the Caliph himself—and then swear allegiance to him as the head of the community and the embodiment of the principle of Sunnī unity. The distinction between Caliphate and Sultanate is not so much one between religious and secular, as rather, in Bagehot's terms, between the 'dignified' and the 'efficient' parts of the government—between those which 'excite and preserve the reverence of the population' and those 'by which it, in fact, works and rules'. The Caliph represented authority, the Sultan power. The Sultan empowered the Caliph, who authorized him in return. The Caliph reigned but did not rule; the Sultan did both.

For a while the Seljuq great Sultanate was respected as a single universal Sunnī institution. Other monarchs used the title Sultan informally, as in earlier times, but refrained from putting it on their coins. With the decay and break-up of the Seljuq Empire, however, 'Sultan' was more widely and more commonly used, becoming the normal Sunnī title for anyone who claimed to be the head of state and did not recognize any suzerain. As such, the title was used by rulers in North Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Persia, India, and other countries.

In 1258 the Mongol invaders of Iraq executed the last Caliph of Baghdad, and in so doing laid the ghost of an institution that was already dead. Until 1517 a line of shadow-caliphs held office—or rather title—in Cairo, as pensioners of the Mamlūk Sultans; they exercised no power, and won only limited recognition outside the Egyptian dominions. After the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, the

last of them was sent to Istanbul, whence he returned as a private citizen some years later. Thereafter there were no Caliphs, and the Sultans ruled alone as the supreme sovereigns of Islam, every Sultan his own Caliph. The word Caliph became one of the many titles which the Sultans added to their titulature, and retained little or nothing of its old significance, until it was revived in the eighteenth century.

Yet, despite the extinction of the Caliphate and the dismemberment of the world of Islam into a multiplicity of separate, often warring sovereignties, the feeling of identity and cohesion, of a single *umma dūn al-nās*, a community apart from other men, remained powerful and effective. Though too weak to preserve the political unity of the world of Islam, it was strong enough to prevent, for a very long time, the emergence of permanent and stable political entities within that world, whether national, territorial, or dynastic. The titulature of Muslim monarchs offers an interesting contrast with that of the rulers of Christendom. In Christian Europe, besides a pope and two Roman emperors, there were kings of the Franks, Goths, and other peoples, later of France, England, and other lands. In Islam, ethnic titles are rare, and even where they occur are of minor importance; territorial titles of sovereignty are virtually unknown. The titles used by Muslim rulers are elaborate and significant; they do not, however, normally include any designation of the territory or people over which the sovereign claims authority. In pre-Mongol times this silence reflected the instability and variation of the political entities of that time, when it was very rare for two successive rulers—let alone successive dynasties—to rule over precisely the same territory. But it remains a feature even of the post-Mongol period, when countries came to have more permanent frontiers and more durable regimes. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, there were three large monarchies in the Middle East, governed by rulers whom modern scholars know as the Sultan of Turkey, the Sultan of Egypt, and the Shah of Persia. None of these titles was used by the rulers themselves, though all three—in slightly modified

forms—were applied to them by their neighbours. For a Muslim sovereign, the only acceptable definition of the extent of his sovereignty was Islam itself—and all three claimed, in their own titulature, to be lords of Islam, of the Muslims, or of the Islamic lands. A territorial or an ethnic designation was derogatory, and was applied to a rival to show the limited and local nature of his rule. It is in this spirit that, in the correspondence between the Turkish Sultan and the Persian Shah, each refers to himself as the sovereign of Islam, and to his neighbour as the Sultan of Rūm (the Turks or Turkey) or the Shah of ʿAjam (the Persians or Persia). Territorial sovereignties did of course exist, and some of them were of very long duration. Turkey was the seat of the greatest and most lasting of all the Muslim Empires, with a strong sense of identity, loyalty, and mission—yet the name Turkey was unknown there until it was borrowed from Europe and officially adopted by the Republic in 1923. Iran and Egypt are ancient names, rich in memories and associations—the former the home of a distinctive language and culture, the latter a country vividly defined by both geography and history, and for centuries the base of an independent Muslim power. Yet neither name appears in the protocol and titles, the coins, documents, or inscriptions of its rulers. Only in the nineteenth century did Muslims, under the impact of European ideas and example, begin to think in terms of ethnic and territorial nationhood, and to redefine their sovereignties and aspirations accordingly. Even in the present-day world of nation states, there are signs of imperfect acceptance of the new classification, and of a hankering for older loyalties, larger yet more exclusive.

The sense of common identity, which inhibited the development of states and nations within Islam, also dominated the relations between the Muslim community and the outside. 'Unbelief is one nation', runs a saying attributed to the Prophet. Though the attribution is dubious, the sentiment is authentic, and finds more formal expression in the legal doctrine according to which the world is divided into the House of Islam (*Dār al-Islām*) and the

House of War (*Dār al-Ḥarb*). The former consists of the lands where the law of Islam prevails—that is, broadly, the Muslim Empire; the latter is the rest of the world. As there is only one God in heaven, so there can only be one sovereign and one law on earth. The Muslim state must tolerate and protect the unbelievers under its rule, provided that they are not polytheists and follow one of the permitted religions; it may not, however, recognize the permanent existence of another polity outside Islam. In time, all mankind must accept Islam or submit to Muslim rule. Meanwhile, it is the duty of the Muslims to struggle until this is accomplished.

The name of this duty is *jihād*, an Arabic word meaning effort or striving; one who performs it is called *mujāhid* (see above, pp. 137–8, for a use of this term in the Muslim Indian context). The word occurs in the Koran a number of times in the military sense of making war against the unbelievers. In the early centuries of Islam, during the great age of religious and imperial expansion, this came to be its normal meaning. The *jihād* was the holy war for Islam, a religious duty prescribed by the faith. It is a collective duty of the community as a whole, but becomes an individual duty of every Muslim in border areas, in battle areas, or wherever the sovereign decides that the time has come to make it so. It is also a perpetual duty, which will lapse only when all the world is won for Islam.

Between the Muslims and the rest of the world there was therefore, according to the classical jurists, a religiously and legally obligatory state of war, which could only end with the conversion or subjugation of all mankind. A treaty of peace between the Muslim state and a non-Muslim state was thus juridically impossible. The war could not be terminated; it could only be interrupted, for reasons of necessity or expediency, by a truce. Such an arrangement could, in the view of the jurists, only be provisional. It should not exceed ten years in duration, and could at any time be repudiated unilaterally by the Muslims, who were, however, required by the law to give the other side due notice before resuming hostilities. Other provisions of the law regulate the opening of

hostilities, the conduct of warfare, and the treatment of prisoners and non-combatants.

The law of *jihād*, like much else in Muslim jurisprudence, received its basic shape during the first century and a half of the Islamic era, when the victorious armies of the universal Caliphate were advancing on France, China, and India, and there seemed no reason to doubt that the final triumph of Islam in all the world was not only inevitable but near. Thereafter, in international as in constitutional matters, a widening gap appeared between legal doctrine and political fact, which politicians ignored and jurists did their best to conceal. While the universal Caliphate broke up into smaller states, the irresistible and permanent *jihād* came to an end, and a relationship of mutual tolerance was established between the Muslim world and the rest. The latter remained the 'House of War', but its conquest was postponed from historic to messianic time. In the meantime, a more or less stable frontier existed between the two, on which peace rather than war was the normal condition. The peace might be infringed by raiding on land and sea; the frontier might occasionally be violently displaced, through some renewal of major conflict—but from medieval times onwards such displacements could mean the withdrawal, as well as the advance, of the boundaries of Muslim rule.

These changes, and the consequent development of political and commercial relations with the non-Muslim world, posed new problems for the jurists to solve. They responded, as in other fields, with skilful interpretations. The duty of *jihād* was qualified and attenuated.[1] The cessation of hostilities with the House of War could be effected only by a limited truce, but such a truce could be renewed as often as necessary, and thus become in fact a legally regulated state of peace. Some jurists, though not all, recognized an intermediate status, the House of Truce or House of Covenant (*Dār al-Ṣulḥ* or *Dār al-ʿAhd*), between the Houses of War and of

[1] In modern times, apologists have appeared who entirely disregard the classical juridical tradition, and interpret *jihād* as a purely defensive obligation—some of them even as a purely moral struggle.

Islam. This consisted of non-Muslim states which entered into a contractual relationship with the Muslim state, undertaking to recognize Muslim overlordship and pay tribute, but retaining their own autonomy and form of government. By choosing to regard gifts as tribute, Muslim rulers and their legal advisers could extend the range of the covenant (*'ahd*) to cover a wide variety of political, military, and commercial agreements with non-Muslim powers. The safe-conduct given to a *ḥarbī*—i.e. a non-Muslim from the House of War, visiting the Muslim lands—was called an *amān*; its holder was a *musta'min*. Any free adult Muslim could give an *amān* to one or a few persons; the head of the Muslim state could give a collective *amān* to a larger entity, such as a city, a country, or a commercial interest. The practice of *amān* greatly facilitated the growth of diplomacy and commerce between Islam and Christendom, and made possible the emergence of resident communities of European traders in Muslim cities. It provided the main legal basis, on the Muslim side, for peaceful contacts and communications with Christian states, until, from the late Crusades period onwards, these were to an increasing extent regulated by European commercial and diplomatic practice.

The Islamic Empire and community expanded principally to the west and to the east. In the north and south, the empty Eurasian plains and the deserts and jungles of Africa offered few attractions, and the advance of Islam in these regions was slow and late (see above, Chapter III (*A*) and (*B*)). The main effort of the conquerors and missionaries was directed to more populous and more rewarding countries—westwards to North Africa and Europe, eastwards across Persia to Central Asia and the approaches to India and China. On both sides there were formidable adversaries; in the West, the Empires and kingdoms of Christendom; in the East, the great Empire of Persia, and beyond that the warlike peoples of the steppes and forests.

Almost from the start there was a radical difference between the two struggles, in East and West. The Empire of Persia was wholly

overwhelmed by the Muslim invaders, and all its territories and peoples brought under Muslim rule; the Byzantine barrier to Muslim advance was battered and pushed back, but remained standing. The Christian Roman Empire still lived, and a Caesar reigned in Constantinople. His fleets and armies, in defending their city, preserved not only the remnants of the Byzantine Empire, but Christian Europe from invasion and conquest.

The historical tradition of the West acclaims the Frankish victors at Poitiers in 732 as the saviours of Christendom from Islam; Muslim tradition mentions the battle, if at all, only as a minor episode, but has much to say, in history and legend, about the decisive struggle under the walls of Constantinople. There can be little doubt that the Muslim view is the truer. The Franks at Poitiers stilled the last tremor of a force that had reached its limit and was spent; the defenders of Constantinople met and halted that force when it was still fresh and strong. Through eastern Europe the way to the Rhine was shorter and easier than that which the Arabs had taken to the Oxus; it was their failure to conquer Constantinople which saved the Byzantine Empire, and with it Western Christendom, from sharing the fate of Iran and Central Asia.

The Arab conquest, and the resulting political extinction of Iran, had momentous consequences not only for the Persians but also for Islam itself. From Syria, Egypt, and North Africa, the Byzantine magnates could withdraw to Byzantium, leaving their former subjects to the care of new masters. No such escape was open to the magnates of the fallen Persian Empire. Apart from a small group who fled to India, the Persians had to remain where they were, endure the new domination, and find their place in it as best they could. It is not surprising that the Persian nobility, gentry, and priesthood, with their reserves of skill and experience and their recent memories of lost greatness, should have played so great a role in the development of Islamic society and culture, government and opposition—even of the Islamic religion, as the old Persian faiths dwindled into insignificance, and their followers took refuge in Islam from defeat and despair.

In the East, Islam had triumphed. Iran was conquered entirely; the Empire of Chosroes was dead, the faith of Zoroaster was dying. The political talents and religious fervour of the Iranians were both gained for the cause of Islam. Beyond the eastern borders of Iran there were many peoples and great kingdoms—but none that could offer any serious threat or competition to the universal message of Muḥammad and the universal law of his community. India and China, during the formative classical period of Islam, impinged only remotely on the Muslim consciousness; they were known, however, to be inhabited by polytheists and idolators, who possessed no revealed religion of their own, and were therefore ripe for conversion to Islam. The same was true of the warlike but teachable peoples of the steppes who, once converted, brought an immense accession of new strength to the Muslim cause. In the East there seemed to be no real limit to the expansion of Islam. The process was continuous and irreversible—and each new advance brought new resources, human and material, to help prepare the next.

In the West, the position was entirely different. The Christian populations of the conquered lands, sustained by their awareness of a free Christendom beyond the frontier, were better able than the Persians to survive the rigours and blandishments of conquest. The Islamization of these countries was slower, and to this day numerous Christian minorities remain. Even more important was the danger and challenge which the Christian Empire offered to Islam itself. In the West, unlike the East, Islam was compelled to recognize a rival, even a peer—another revealed religion and universal state, with a profound sense of mission and a message for all mankind. Far from being ready for conversion, they were themselves anxious to convert others to their faith, and enjoyed no small success in this enterprise.

This difference in quality between the war against Christendom and the wars on the other frontiers of Islam was soon recognized. The latter were merely stages in the progressive and inevitable Islamization of the pagan peoples; the former was a struggle

against a hostile religious and political system, which denied the very basis of the Islamic world role—and did so in terms which were both familiar and intelligible. The Muslim conviction of predestined final victory did not entirely conceal the significance and uncertainty of this wide-ranging and long-drawn-out conflict between the two faiths and societies, whose successive ideological stages are described in detail in Chapter I above, pp. 9 ff. In Muslim writings, the Christian world becomes the 'House of War' *par excellence*—and the war against Christendom the very model and prototype of the *jihād*.

The struggle between Islam and Christendom, in its military aspect, may be seen in four overlapping phases—two of attack, and two of counter-attack. In each of these phases, vast and populous territories were transferred by conquest from one side to the other, with profound and far-reaching effects on both.

The clash between Islam and Christendom began during the lifetime of the Prophet. In the earlier stages of his career, when the main fight was against Arab paganism, his attitude to the Jews and the Christians was friendly and respectful. The leadership of the community brought him into contact and then conflict with both. At first the Jews, strongly represented at Medina, were the immediate enemy, while the Christians remained potential allies and converts. Later, when the expanding influence of the community of Medina brought the Muslims into collision with Christian tribes in Arabia and on the northern borders, relations with Christianity, as with Judaism, culminated in war:

> Fight against those who do not believe in Allah nor in the Last Day, who do not forbid what Allah and His Apostle have forbidden, nor practise the true religion, among those who have been given the Book, until they pay the *jizya*[1] from their hand, they being humbled.[2] The Jews say:

[1] This term was later specialized to mean the poll-tax paid by the non-Muslim subjects of the Muslim state. In the Koran it probably has the more general meaning of payment or recompense.

[2] The precise meaning of this phrase has been disputed by modern scholars. In

'"Uzayr[1] is the son of God.' The Christians say: 'Christ is the son of God.' This is what they say, with their own mouths, imitating what was said by the unbelievers before. May God fight them! How they are deceived! [Koran, ix. 29–30.]

These verses were taken as abrogating previous revelations which expressed a friendlier and more hopeful attitude to the non-Muslims; they provided the scriptural basis for the legal doctrines which required Muslims to fight and conquer the Christians and Jews, and, if they refused Islam, to impose on them fiscal and social penalties.

According to Muslim tradition, in the year 7 of the *hijra* (A.D. 628), the Prophet sent letters from Medina to Caesar and Chosroes —the Roman and Persian Emperors—informing them of his mission, and summoning them to accept Islam or suffer the penalties of unbelief. The texts of these letters, and even the story of their being sent, are now generally regarded as apocryphal, but, like so much of the Muslim tradition, they reflect an accurate, if subsequent, assessment of realities. Whether Muḥammad really contemplated the conquest and conversion of the two great Empires is a matter on which scholars have differed. There can, however,

two recent translations of the Koran, it is rendered 'jusqu'à ce qu'ils paient la *jizya*, directement(?) et alors qu'ils sont humiliés' (R. Blachère); 'bis sie kleinlaut aus der Hand Tribut entrichten' (R. Paret). Other recent renderings are: 'until they give compensation (tax) for support from solidarity (shown by us to them), while they are in a state of lowliness' (F. Rosenthal); 'until they pay the *jizya* out of ability and sufficient means, they (nevertheless) being inferior' (M. J. Kister); 'until they give the reward due for a benefaction (since their lives are spared), while they are ignominious (namely, for not having fought unto death)' (M. Bravmann). See Rosenthal in *The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume* (New York, 1953), pp. 68–72; Kister and Bravmann in *Arabica*, x (1963), 94–5; xi (1964), 272–8; xiii (1966), 307–14; xiv (1967), 90–1, 326–7. Whatever the original meaning of the text, the commentators and jurists have interpreted it as imposing a tax, and prescribing the manner in which it should be paid.

[1] The Muslim tradition identifies 'Uzayr with the Biblical Ezra. The significance of this phrase has baffled modern scholarship. The least improbable suggestion is that of Paul Casanova, 'Idris et 'Ouzair', *Journal Asiatique*, ccv (1924), 356–60, who identifies 'Uzayr with Azael—Uzael, a fallen angel in Rabbinic literature.

be no doubt that he initiated the processes by which this was in large measure accomplished.

The first Islamic conquest was Khaybar, an oasis some 100 miles north of Medina, on the road to Syria. It was inhabited by Jews, including some who had been evicted from Medina. In 628 Muḥammad led an army of about 1,600 men against Khaybar, and in six weeks was able to conquer the whole oasis. The Jews were allowed to retain their families, and practise their religion. Their lands and property were forfeit to the conquerors, but they were allowed to remain in possession of their fields and till them, in return for paying half the harvest to the new owners.

At a later date the Jews of Khaybar were expelled from their oasis by the Caliph ʿUmar, allegedly so that there should be only one religion, Islam, in the holy land of Arabia. The arrangement originally imposed on them by the Prophet, however, became, with minor variations, the pattern followed in later conquests. The expansion to the north, into Christian territory, began during Muḥammad's last years; his successors brought under Muslim rule vast regions of Christendom, including the Christian heartlands in the Near East, the whole of North Africa, Spain, parts of France and Italy, and most of the Mediterranean islands.

For the medieval Muslim, the swift and overwhelming victories won by the Arabs in the heroic age of Islam were providential—proof that their religion was the true one and that God was on their side. In an age of scepticism, historians have sought, with varying success, for more worldly and measurable explanations.

Of the military history of the Arab conquests, little is known. From that little, it would appear that, unlike some other builders of Empire, the Arabs possessed no special tactical or technical device, which could give them superiority over their opponents—nothing like the Macedonian phalanx, the Roman legion, the horses of the *conquistadores*, or the fire-power of the colonialists.[1]

[1] G.-H. Bousquet, 'Observations sur la nature et les causes de la Conquête arabe', *Studia Islamica*, vi (1956), 48.

On the contrary, as outsiders attacking the two great military Empires of the day, they suffered from a certain inferiority in skills and armaments as well as in numbers. They had no experience of fighting in large formations.[1] In the early days they had no siegecraft and no siege-weapons, and could therefore only blockade, but not besiege, fortified cities. They had no fleet, and even on land had no equivalent of the heavy armoured cavalry, the cataphracts, of Byzantium and Persia.

These disadvantages, though important, should not, however, be exaggerated. In the seventh century the technological gap between a sedentary, civilized state and the warriors from the steppe or desert was still narrow, and could be bridged. In other respects, the Arabs had much the same equipment as their enemies.

To offset their inferiority in weapons and professional skill, the Arabs had certain important advantages over their enemies. One of these was both logistic and strategic—the use of the camel and therefore of the desert. Though of little or no value for fighting, the camel was of immense importance for transport—for the movement of men, equipment, and supplies. By this means, the Arabs were able to use the desert as the modern maritime empires used the sea, as a safe line of communication beyond the reach or knowledge of the enemy. Through the desert they could achieve surprise in attack, or safety in retreat; they could advance, withdraw, or reinforce at will. In each of the conquered provinces, they established their seat of government on the edge of the desert and the sown, using an existing city like Damascus where possible, or

[1] On this point, an acute observation by Professor W. H. McNeill should be noted: 'It is worth pointing out that daily prayers must have had much the same psychological effect upon an army on campaign as does modern close-order drill. Precise gestures and recitation of prayers conducted in unison five times daily must have inculcated sentiments of solidarity within the ranks and habits of obedience to the commander, who in the early days was also prayer leader. Such exercises no doubt did much to overcome the chronic weakness of any nomad confederacy—insubordination resulting from tribal and personal rivalries. The further conviction that death fighting in Allah's cause assured immediate access to Paradise gave an additional dash of recklessness to each warrior's charge' (McNeill, *The Rise of the West* (Chicago, 1963), p. 468, n. 11).

founding a new one like Kūfa, Fusṭāṭ, or Qayrawān, where it was not. These garrison cities were the Bombays, Calcuttas, and Singapores of the Arab Empire, the ports of the desert through which the provinces were first penetrated, then conquered, and for a while governed.

A second advantage was one of morale. The Arabs were warriors in a holy war—full of faith and enthusiasm, sustained by a belief in divine favour which was reinforced by each successive victory and the rewards that it brought; their opponents were highly trained professionals, mostly mercenaries—proficient but indifferent, and discouraged by dissension within their own ranks and hostility from the civil population. The Arab fighters, less hampered by status, caste, or privilege, threw up commanders of a brilliance which the military hierarchies of Byzantium and Persia could not equal. It was in similar circumstances that the ragged conscripts of the French Revolution routed the veterans of the continental monarchies.

While retaining their own advantages, the Arabs were able in a remarkably short time to acquire and master the weapons and techniques which they had lacked. In pre-Islamic Arabia the usual method of combat was the famous *karr wa-farr*, which might be approximately translated as hit and run—a technique admirably suited to tribal warfare and raiding, but ill adapted to fighting against disciplined armies. According to the traditional biographies, the Prophet introduced the notion of an order of battle (*taʿbiya*), and at Badr arranged his few hundred followers in ranks, which he dressed himself. A Koranic verse, 'Allah loves those who fight for His cause in ranks, like a lead-sealed building' (lix. 4), has been taken as indicating divine approval for close formation warfare.[1] In the wars against the Byzantines and Persians, the Arabs soon learnt to manœuvre and fight in large regular formations, to construct and maintain an order of battle, to procure and use the most up-to-date engines of warfare known at the time. Most

[1] Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddima*, ed. E. Quatremère (Paris, 1858), ii. 66; English translation by F. Rosenthal (New York, 1958), ii. 75.

astonishing of all, they were able, with the help of the native Christian population of Syria, Egypt, and North Africa, to build and man war-fleets which could defeat the Byzantine and other Christian navies in the Mediterranean waters which they had so long dominated.

With the aid of their new naval power, the Arabs launched a series of land and sea attacks on Constantinople. By 674 they were able to occupy the peninsula of Cyzicus, in the sea of Marmara, and establish an operational base, from which, for several years, they attacked and blockaded the city during the spring and summer months. In 678 they were decisively defeated in a great sea-battle before the walls of the city, and compelled to withdraw—the first real defeat suffered by the Muslims in their Holy War. A period of comparative inactivity followed, during which warfare between the Muslim and Byzantine Empires was restricted to border raiding for prisoners and booty.

A new advance began in the early decades of the eighth century. In the East, Arab armies reached the Jaxartes and the Indus; in the West, with their Berber auxiliaries, they crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, and began the conquest of Spain. In the centre, the Umayyad prince Maslama took over the command of the frontiers, and launched a series of land offensives against Anatolia. These culminated in the greatest attempt by the Arabs to capture Constantinople, the combined land and sea attack in 716–17. This expedition, which also ended in defeat and withdrawal, is famous in Muslim myth and folklore, and especially in the later heroic tales and sagas of the Holy War. These stories, together with the prophecies that became current at the time, illustrate the changing Muslim attitude to the Holy War. The mighty battles against the infidel belong to a remote and heroic past, the final Muslim victory to a distant and messianic future.

After the withdrawal from Constantinople in 717, the Muslim armies continued to advance, both in the far east and the far west of their empire—but they were reaching the limits of their expansion. In the West, the conquest of Sicily in 827–902 was the only

major success. In the East, Muslim power stopped at the borders of India and China. The Byzantine frontier was relatively tranquil, until in 782 another prince, this time of the ʿAbbāsid house, led an army across Anatolia to the Bosphorus, where he won a victory, exacted tribute—and then went home. The victory brought great prestige to the young prince Hārūn. It was on this occasion, a chronicler tells us, that his father the Caliph al-Mahdī appointed him second heir and conferred on him the title al-Rashīd, the Rightly Guided.

This was the last major expedition sent by the Arab Caliphate in the direction of Constantinople, the capture of which was postponed—mistakenly as it turned out—to the end of time. There were several reasons for the end of the *jihād*. The fire and passion of the early conquerors were long since spent, their hunger, whether for booty or martyrdom, satisfied; in place of the warriors in the Holy War, there were now regular, professional armies, not vastly different from those which the Arabs had defeated. The ʿAbbāsids had shifted the capital eastwards, and were transforming the Caliphate into an oriental Empire; their interest in warfare was perfunctory, their concern with their Western borders minimal. For a while new Muslim states, based on Mediterranean countries, continued the struggle, but even these came to share the general Muslim acceptance that the heroic age was over, that the boundaries between the House of Islam and the House of War were more or less permanent, and that some form of recognition of non-Muslim states was unavoidable.

In the meantime, the great Christian counter-offensive was already beginning, encouraged by the obvious weakness and disunity of the Muslim world. The first serious inroads into Muslim territory were made by heathen peoples—the Khazars in the East, the Vikings in the West. These were, however, mere episodes. Of far greater consequence was the recovery of Christian power, and the growing determination to reconquer the former Christian lands which had been lost to Islam. The reconquest began at the extremities. In Spain, the Christian principalities that

had managed to survive precariously in the far north of the peninsula began to consolidate and extend their realms, helped by Frankish and later Norman attacks on the Muslim lands. In the East, the Christian peoples of the Caucasus, the Georgians and the Armenians, raised their heads again, and won a steadily increasing measure of freedom from their Muslim overlords. In the second half of the tenth century, the Byzantine Empire was able to launch a series of major offensives against the Muslims, which resulted in the recovery of Crete, Antioch, and Samosata, the annexation or subjugation of parts of northern Syria and Mesopotamia, and the advance of Byzantine raiding parties as far south as Jerusalem.

During the eleventh century, the Christian advance against Islam was in full flood. In the East, the kingdom of Georgia survived Muslim attacks, and entered on its great age of expansion, in which it dominated the whole Caucasian area from the Black Sea to the Caspian. In Spain and Portugal, the tide of reconquest reached Toledo and Coimbra; in the Mediterranean, Christian invaders recovered Sardinia and Sicily from their Muslim rulers. Finally, from 1098, Western European Christians conquered and for a while held parts of Syria and Palestine, through a series of campaigns which were known in Christendom as Crusades.

They were not so known among the Muslims. It has been remarked as odd that the Arabic historiography of the Crusades, so rich and sophisticated in other respects, shows little knowledge or even curiosity concerning the movement that had brought these invaders to the East. The words Crusade and Crusader do not appear in contemporary Muslim writings, and indeed have no equivalents in Arabic, until these appeared in Christian Arabic writings at a somewhat later date. For Muslim contemporaries, the Crusaders are simply the Franks or the infidels—one more group among the many barbarians and unbelievers who were attacking the world of Islam, distinguished only by their warlike ferocity and the success that it brought them.

Much has been written about the influence of the Crusades on Europe; and in Chapter I above, the effects of contacts in the

Crusading period on the western image of Islam are considered (see pp. 21 ff.). Rather less has been written about the effects of these and related struggles on the lands of Islam. For the first time since the beginning, the Muslims had been compelled by military defeat to cede vast areas of old Islamic territory to Christian rulers, and to leave large Muslim populations under Christian rule. Both facts were accepted with remarkable equanimity. In both West and East, Muslim rulers were willing to have dealings with their new neighbours, and even on occasion to make alliances with them against brother Muslims. The jurists, who had demonstrated the necessity—as an obligation of the Holy Law—of submitting to tyrants, had little difficulty in extending the argument to include unbelievers. 'Whose power prevails must be obeyed', provided only that he allow Muslims to practise their religion and obey the Holy Law. The realm of such a sovereign may even, according to some jurists, be considered as part of the House of Islam.

At first, the Muslim world responded to the loss of the Levant with almost total indifference. The original *jihād* had long since ended, and the spirit of the *jihād* was lost and forgotten. The age was one of violence and change, when Muslim lands were subject to a whole series of attacks and invasions, from Central Asia and Berber Africa as well as from Christendom. Even in Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo, the loss of Palestine and of the Syrian coast evoked very little interest. Elsewhere, it passed virtually unnoticed.[1] In the fragmented Syria of the time, the new states created by the Crusaders, like those of the Turks from the East, soon found their place in the local political balance, and before long were involved in a pattern of rivalries and alliances to which religion and origin had little relevance.

[1] Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, ed. C. J. Tornberg (Leiden, 1851–76), x. 192–3, writing in the early thirteenth century, describes how the first refugees from Palestine arrived in Baghdad, told of their troubles, and appealed for help. None was forthcoming. The lack even of information is shown by an Iraqi poet who, lamenting the fall of Jerusalem and the failure of the Muslims to rally to its defence, speaks of the conquerors as Rūm-Byzantines.

In the West, the Christian reconquest achieved complete and final victory. Muslim rulers, and then even Muslim subjects, were evicted from Spain and Portugal, and before long the triumphant Spaniards and Portuguese were descending on the shores of North Africa. In the East, the Crusaders managed to maintain themselves for a while, thanks to repeated reinforcements from Europe—but their possessions were weakened and reduced by successive Muslim attacks, until the last bastion of Latin power in Palestine, the port of Acre, fell to the Mamlūks in 1291.

Only two relics of the Crusades now remained in the East—the Latin kingdom of Cyprus and the Franco-Armenian kingdom of Cilicia. Significantly, both monarchs are denoted in Muslim protocol not by the word *malik*—king—but by *mutamallik*, pseudo-king or *soi-disant* king, since both were regarded as usurpers in what was rightfully Muslim territory.[1] Both countries were in due course reconquered for Islam—Cilicia by the Mamlūks, Cyprus, rather later, by the Ottomans.

Some remnant of the Crusading spirit lingered on in Europe for a while, and inspired some rather futile expeditions against the Mamlūk Sultanate of Egypt and against the new and menacing power of the Ottoman Turks. But Europe had lost interest, and was occupied with other things. And while Christians forgot the Crusade, Muslims remembered the *jihād*, and once again launched a Holy War for the faith—first, to restore and defend what had been lost to infidel invaders, then, in triumph, to bring the message and power of Islam to new lands and peoples that had never known them before.

The influence of the Crusaders in the countries which they had ruled for up to two centuries was slight. They had never been more than a dominant minority, consisting of Catholics of West European origin—barons, clergy, and merchants, with their various retainers and subordinates. The mass of the population, including almost all the villagers, was indigenous, consisting of Muslims, eastern Christians, and some Jews. After the departure of the

[1] al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā* (Cairo, 1331–40/1913–22), viii, 51–2.

Crusaders, these lands were reincorporated into Islamic society without difficulty.

In two respects, however, the Crusades left a permanent mark,[1] One of these was the worsening of the position of the *dhimmī*s, the non-Muslim subjects of the Muslim state. In the early days of the Islamic expansion, these had been subjected to a number of restrictions, mostly precautions for the safety of Muslim garrisons in newly conquered provinces. Though some of these restrictions had found their way into the law-books, they were rarely strictly enforced,[2] and the *dhimmī*s had on the whole enjoyed a large measure of social and economic as well as religious freedom. The embitterment resulting from the long struggle with Christendom, the needs of security in areas of mixed population, at a time when religious loyalty was primary, and the example of persecution set by Christian kings and prelates, all combined to bring a harsher attitude. From Crusading times onwards, relations between Muslims and their Christian or Jewish compatriots became more distant and more difficult. The *dhimmī*s are socially isolated, subject to discrimination, and occasionally—though not often—even to persecution.

The other permanent change is in relations with Europe. Before the eleventh century, these were insignificant. The oft-cited exchange of embassies between Charlemagne and the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd is attested only by the Frankish chronicler Einhard. If it took place at all, it was of too little importance to attract the attention of the Muslim historians, since they made no mention of it. A later embassy, sent by Bertha of Tuscany to the Caliph al-Muktafī in 906, is recorded merely as a curiosity. Even in the far west of Islam, in North Africa and Spain, diplomatic exchanges with Europe were minimal. A single embassy, that of the

[1] See C. Cahen, 'Crusades', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn.

[2] It may be noted that one ruler who did enforce them, the 'Abbāsid Caliph al-Mutawakkil (d. 861), was the originator of the famous yellow badge, which he required the *dhimmī*s to wear on their garments. On this point see E. Strauss, 'The Social Isolation of Ahl adh-Dhimma', in *P. Hirschler Memorial Book* (Budapest, 1949), p. 76.

Spanish Jew Ibrāhīm b. Yaʿqūb al-Ṭurṭūshī, sent by the Caliph of Cordova to the Emperor Otto in the mid tenth century, is the source of most Muslim information concerning Frankish Europe in the early Middle Ages. Ibrahim's account of his travels is lost, but is known from quotations in later Arabic geographical writings.

The reconquest and the Crusades brought new knowledge, notably through the writings of Western Muslim geographers like al-Idrīsī (d. 1169) in Sicily and the Andalusian Ibn Saʿīd (d. 1274). More important, they vastly increased the previously rather limited commercial and personal contacts between Muslims and European Christians. During the Crusades, European merchants, chiefly Italian, established themselves in the Levant ports under Latin rule, where they formed organized communities subject to their own chiefs and governed by their own laws. The Muslim recapture of these ports did not end the activities of the European merchants; on the contrary, Muslim rulers were careful not to discourage this trade, which was a source of advantage to them as well as to those engaged in it. Before long colonies of European merchants appeared even in Egypt and other places which had never been under Crusader rule.

From the point of view of the Muslim jurists, the arrangements made with the European colonies were a variant of the classical *amān*, and the resident merchants had the status of *musta'min*. In fact, however, the pattern of the agreements was a European one, modelled on the treaties which the Italian merchant republics had concluded with the Byzantine Empire and the Crusader states. The concept of a bilateral contract or treaty between governments was alien to both Muslim law and Muslim political practice; its adoption was a sign of growing European influence.[1] The essence

[1] It is noteworthy that even when such treaties had become the normal pattern in relations between Muslim and Christian states, they did not occur in relations between Muslim governments. Thus, the Turkish collections of the treaties of the Ottoman government contain only treaties with Christian powers. They do not, before the nineteenth century, contain agreements with Persia, Mogul India, or other Muslim powers. Even the famous and decisive Peace of Amasya, concluded

of such a treaty was the privilege accorded by a Muslim ruler to a Christian state, authorizing the citizens of that state to trade and reside in his dominions, without becoming liable to the disabilities imposed on his own non-Muslim subjects. Numerous agreements of this kind were obtained by European states from the rulers of Turkey, Egypt, and other Muslim countries in the Mediterranean. In Ottoman times, these privileges came to be known as capitulations, from the chapter-headings—Latin *capitula*—into which they were divided.

While European commerce flourished and grew, European arms suffered a series of devastating defeats. The Crusaders were evicted from all their conquests—and vast areas of hitherto Christian territory were lost to Muslim attackers. Once again, as in the early days of Islam, a Holy War was launched against Christendom—and this time the Muslim advance reached to the very heart of Europe.

The movement which defeated the Crusaders did not arise from countries which they had occupied, nor indeed among the peoples whom they conquered or threatened. The new impetus came from further East, and from a new power in Islam, that of the Turks. Their coming preceded, and in a sense provoked, the Crusades. The Muslims first encountered the Turks on the Central Asian borders of their Empire, and from an early date began to import them as slaves, chiefly for service as soldiers. These military slaves came to be known as *mamlūk*s, an Arabic word meaning 'owned', to distinguish them from the humbler slaves, usually African, employed in the house or on the land. Though technically of servile status, the Mamlūks became a privileged military caste, wielding a great and growing power in the Muslim state. Recruited as children by capture or purchase, they received a long and rigorous professional training, and were bound by strong corporate loyalties. From the ninth century onwards, the Caliphs relied almost entirely on Turkish soldiers and commanders, who thus

in 1555 between Turkey and Persia, does not figure in the collections, and survives only in the form of an exchange of letters between the Sultan and the Shah.

gained first military and then political hegemony. Commanders became governors, and governors founded dynasties. The first Turkish rulers in Islam appeared in the ninth century; by the eleventh century there were few rulers, from Central Asia to Egypt, who were not Turks.

Most of these Turkish regimes were founded by men of Central Asian origin, who entered the Islamic world as slaves, were converted to Islam as part of their training, and in due course rose through the military hierarchy to become generals or *condottieri*. They had little or no connection with the free Turkish tribes beyond the frontier, from whom they had been taken and separated in childhood. It was the westward movement of these free Turks, at a slightly later date, that was to have momentous effects on both Islam and Christendom.

The Turks of Central Asia were never conquered by the Muslims but only by Islam. Wandering mystics and missionaries, themselves for the most part Turks, travelled among the unsubjugated tribes beyond the Jaxartes, preaching the simple and militant faith that flourished on the frontier between Islam and heathendom (see above, Chapter III (*B*), p. 127).

The westward migration of the steppe peoples reached its peak during the eleventh century. They advanced along two main routes, north of the Caspian into southern Russia and Eastern Europe, and south of the Caspian into the lands of Islam. The northern invaders are known as Qipchaqs, after the name of the dominant Turkish tribe among them; the southern as Seljuqs, after the family that ruled over them and founded a new Islamic Empire, the Great Sultanate.

The Qipchaqs, also known as Polovtsi and Cumans, for a while ranged over the whole area from the Ural river to the borders of Hungary. To some extent this was old Turkish territory, having been ruled by such Turkic peoples as the Khazars, the Pechenegs, and the Volga Bulghārs; from the mid eleventh century until the coming of the Mongols in the thirteenth, it was dominated by the Qipchaqs, who, even after the Mongol Conquest, were able to

assimilate their Mongol masters and impress their own character on the Mongol Khanate formed in their country.

Before the coming of the Qipchaqs, Islam had made some headway among the Turkic peoples of the Don and Volga basins. The Bulghārs, who founded a city and state at the confluence of the Kama and Volga rivers, were predominantly Muslim by the tenth century, and were active in spreading Islam among their neighbours. In 986 they even tried, unsuccessfully, to convert Prince Vladimir of Kiev to Islam. They had greater success among the Turkic tribes.

The Qipchaqs themselves were still pagan when they migrated to Eastern Europe. Some of them became Christian and were merged with the Slavonic-speaking population; others became Muslim, and it was these who came to play a dominant role in the Mongol Khanate on the Volga.

The Mongol conquest of Eastern Europe, in the third and fourth decades of the thirteenth century, for the first time provided a political framework for the steppe peoples that had hitherto ranged over that area. The Mongols established a capital, at Saray on the lower Volga, and founded a dynasty in the line of Batu Khan, the conqueror of Russia, the grandson of Chingiz Khan. The Mongols were few in number, and relied heavily on the Qipchaqs, in time adopting their language and merging with them. Their state was known in Russian and hence in European usage as the Golden Horde. This name appears to have no equivalent in Oriental sources, which call it the Khanate of the Qipchaq steppe. With the conversion of this Khanate to Islam during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, a Muslim state dominated the whole of Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In the Crimea, in the great river valleys, above all along the Volga, waves of settlement and conversion produced a numerous and active Muslim population, with thriving cities, such as Kazan, Astrakhan, and Baghche Saray, which after the break-up of the Golden Horde became the capitals of independent Muslim Khanates.

The southern invaders, led by the house of Seljuq, were Muslims

from the start, and as Great Sultans came to rule over the heartlands of Islam. The Seljuq Sultans did more than restore the shattered territorial and political unity of Islam. They also brought to it, from the frontier, a deep religious earnestness, which is in marked contrast with the laxness and cynicism of the preceding period. Unlike their brothers who had gone to Baghdad and elsewhere as *mamlūk*s, and had been brought up amid the sophistications of the old Islamic cities, the free Turks who came with the Seljuqs retained the fervent and militant faith of the frontier, of the warriors in the Holy War.

The advance of the Turks from Central Asia across Iran to Mesopotamia was accompanied by a great religious revival—more specifically, a revival of Sunnī orthodoxy. While the Turkish armies expelled the infidel and suppressed the heretic, Sunnī jurists and divines, brought for the first time since the beginnings of Islam into an intimate relationship with the state, began to formulate and disseminate the orthodox answer to unorthodox ideas. The sense of mission and authority of the Turks can be seen in a number of texts. One of the most striking is a passage written by a Turk of Kāshghar in about 1072, in the introduction to a book on the Turkish language: 'I have seen that God has caused the sun of Empire to rise in the mansions of the Turks and has made the circles of the heavens revolve about their kingdom. He gave them the name of Turk and conferred kingship on them and made them kings of the age and placed in their hands the reins of the people of this time and set them above mankind. . . .'[1]

During the centuries of Muslim–Christian coexistence along the Byzantine borders, the Holy War had smouldered on among the march-warriors in the remote lands beyond the Jaxartes. The coming of these frontier-peoples to the West reopened the Holy War against Christendom on a scale unknown since the early days of Islamic expansion. In Transcaucasia, the Seljuqs tried to restore Muslim authority over the Georgians and Armenians. Far more important was the Turkish conquest of eastern and central

[1] Maḥmūd Kāshgharī, *Diwān lughāt al-Turk*, facsimile edn. (Ankara, 1941), p. 2.

Anatolia, the great bastion of the Greek Christian Empire, which had for so long stood in the way of Muslim advance.

The conquest of Anatolia was accomplished by bands of march-warriors and consolidated by migrating nomadic tribes. When the process had already begun, the Sultan sent a Seljuq prince to take charge of the new lands. While the march-warriors fought their way further westwards, officers and officials came from the East to govern and administer what they had won. Thanks to their efforts, a powerful Turkish state was established in Anatolia, with its capital at Konya, the ancient Iconium. The Seljuq dynasty who ruled there until the beginning of the fourteenth century were known as the Sultans of Rūm.[1]

During the period that followed, the Islamic lands of South-West Asia suffered two invasions, from West and East. The invasion of the Crusaders affected only the countries of the eastern Mediterranean; it was soon halted, contained, and eventually repelled, with little permanent effect. The counter-crusade began with an ambitious Turkish officer in the Seljuq service, called Zangī, who carved himself a principality in Mesopotamia and northern Syria. It was continued, with religious fervour as well as political ambition, by his son, Nūr al-Dīn, and brought to an almost successful conclusion by one of Nūr al-Dīn's officers, the famous Saladin, who founded his own dynasty in Egypt and Syria, and dealt what proved to be the decisive blow to the Latin states. Saladin was a Kurd, and relied to some extent on his kinsmen, but his regime and army were of the Turkish type, and under his successors were almost entirely Turkicized. The elimination of the last

[1] This title, one of the very few with a local connotation that have been used by Muslim rulers, requires a note of explanation. Originally, the Sultan of Konya was a regional subordinate of the Seljuq Great Sultan, and the title Sultan of Rūm is a formal recognition of that fact. The subsequent retention of the title is due in part no doubt to normal conservatism, in part to a desire to profit from the continuing power of the great name of Rome. Rūm in Islamic usage means East Rome —that is, the Byzantine Empire. In the Seljuq title it is to be understood in a territorial, not an ethnic sense, and indeed sometimes occurs in the form *Sulṭān bilād-i Rūm*—Sultan of the lands of Rūm.

remnants of Crusader power in Palestine was completed by the Qipchaq Mamlūk rulers of Egypt during the thirteenth century.

The invasion of the Mongols from the East was far more serious. For the first time since the rise of Islam, the Muslims suffered the humiliation of pagan conquest and domination in the central lands of Islam. The Baghdad Caliphate was abolished; Central Asia and Persia, Muslim Anatolia and Iraq were incorporated in a heathen Empire which had its capital in Eastern Asia, from 1267 in Peking. The damage to the Muslim lands has sometimes been exaggerated; there can, however, be no doubt of the blow to Muslim confidence, the shattering impact on Muslim government and society. For a while it seemed that the very survival of Islam was in question, as the Mongol Khans in Persia threatened the last Muslim bulwark in Egypt, and negotiated with Christian powers in Europe for an alliance against the common Islamic enemy.

The danger passed. The negotiations with Europe came to nothing, and within a century the Mongol rulers of West Asia, with their followers, had become Muslim, mostly adopting a Turkish language and character. In retrospect, the coming of the Mongols—the second great migration, after the Turks, of the steppe peoples into south-west Asia—may be seen as a strengthening, not a weakening, of the political and military power of Islam. The monarchies that arose under Turkish and Turkicized Mongol auspices had a quality of stability, steadfastness, and endurance that is lacking in earlier times. This can be seen both in their political institutions and in their military effectiveness. The fourteenth-century Arab historian Ibn Khaldūn saw in the almost universal supremacy of the Turks in Islam a proof of God's concern for the welfare of the Muslims. At a time when the Caliphate had become weak and degenerate, incapable of defending itself against attack, God in His wisdom had brought new rulers and defenders, from among the Turks, 'to revive the dying breath of Islam and restore the unity of the Muslims'.[1]

[1] Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ʿIbar* (Būlāq, 1867), v. 371; cf. D. Ayalon, 'The Wafidia in the Mamluk Kingdom', *Islamic Culture*, XXV (1951), 90.

During the age of Turkish hegemony, the world of Islam recovered its own militancy, and embarked on a series of new *jihād*s, which brought important territorial gains, some of them permanent, to the world of Islam. In the East, the most significant advance was into India. The Arab attack on India in the eighth century was inconclusive, and did not reach beyond the Indus; the effective establishment of Islam and of Muslim power in the Indian sub-continent was the work of a succession of Turkish soldiers and rulers, from the eleventh century onwards.

In the West, there were two major advances into Europe, one by the Qipchaq-Mongol Khanate of the Golden Horde, the other by the Ottoman Turks.

The Ottoman state began as a principality of march-warriors, one of the several states that appeared in Anatolia after the break-up of the Seljuq Sultanate of Rūm. Its European name is a corruption of that of its first ruler, Osman, who is said to have reigned from 1299 to 1326. This principality was neither the biggest nor the strongest of the Anatolian states; it was, however, the westernmost, on the borders of what remained of the Byzantine Empire, and offered the greatest opportunities for Holy War, attracting volunteers from all over Anatolia. In responding to these opportunities, Ottomans created a great Empire and an imperial civilization.

Muḥammad the Conqueror (1444–6, 1451–81) achieved in 1453 the conquest of Constantinople, for so many centuries the coveted goal of Muslim arms, and by the reign of Sulaymān the Magnificent (1520–66) the Ottoman Empire was at the peak of its power. In Europe, the Ottoman armies, masters of Greece and the Balkans, advanced across Hungary, and laid siege to Vienna in 1529; in the East, an Ottoman fleet challenged the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean; in the West, the Muslim rulers of North Africa, now under Ottoman suzerainty, brought Muslim naval power to the western Mediterranean and even, on raids, into the open sea and as far as the British Isles and Iceland.[1] Once again the advance of Islam

[1] In 1627 Algerian corsairs raided Iceland, and took several hundred captives. The

offered a mortal threat to Christendom. The Crusade was over; the *jihād* had taken its place. Richard Knolles, the Elizabethan historian of the Turks, was expressing the common feeling of Europe when he spoke of the Turkish Empire as 'the present Terror of the World'.

The clash between Christian Europe and Ottoman Islam has sometimes been compared with the confrontation, in our own time, between the free world and the Soviets. The comparison is not without merit. On both occasions the West has been threatened by a militant and expanding Empire, impelled by the twin imperial attributes of appetite and a sense of mission, and exalted by a dogmatic belief in perpetual struggle ending in inevitable victory. But the comparison should not be pushed too far. There were exaltation and dogmatism on both sides—and greater tolerance on the Turkish. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the movement of refugees—of those who, in Lenin's vivid phrase, voted with their feet—was from West to East and not, as in our day, from East to West. The flight of the Spanish Jews to Turkey is well known, but is by no means unique. When Ottoman rule in Europe came to an end, the Christian nations they had ruled for centuries were still there, with their languages, their cultures, their religions, even to some extent their institutions, intact, and ready to resume their separate national existence. There are no Muslims today in Spain or Sicily, and no speakers of Arabic.

Muslim and Jewish refugees, Christians with heretical religious and political views, were not the only European beneficiaries of Ottoman rule. The peasantry in the conquered provinces also found their lot much improved. Ottoman imperial government brought unity and security in place of conflict and disorder. There were also important social and economic consequences. In the course of the wars of conquest, a large part of the old hereditary landowning aristocracy was destroyed, and their ownerless estates granted as fiefs to Ottoman soldiers. In the Ottoman system,

event is commemorated in the *Tyrkjaranssaga* of the contemporary Icelandic author Björn Jonsson of Skardsa, as well as in other writings.

however, a fief was basically a grant of the right to collect revenues; it was, theoretically at least, for life or some shorter period, and was forfeit when the holder ceased to perform military service. It carried with it no hereditary rights, and no seigneurial jurisdiction. The peasants, on the other hand, usually enjoyed a form of hereditary tenure which was protected by Ottoman usage from both fragmentation and concentration of ownership. They enjoyed far greater freedom on their farms than previously; the taxes they paid were modestly assessed and humanely collected, in comparison with the practice of previous and neighbouring regimes. This security and prosperity did much to reconcile them to other less attractive aspects of Ottoman rule, and account in large measure for the long tranquillity that reigned in the Ottoman provinces until the explosive irruption of nationalist ideas from the West. As late as the nineteenth century, European visitors to the Balkans comment on the well-being and contentment of the Balkan peasantry, which they compare favourably with conditions in parts of Christian Europe.[1] The contrast was far more striking in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the age of the great peasant revolts in Europe. Even the much-condemned *devshirme*, the compulsory collection of boys from the Christian peasantry for recruitment into the Ottoman army and state service, had its positive aspects. By this means, the humblest villager could rise to the highest and most powerful offices in the Empire. Many did so, and brought their families with them—a form of social mobility impossible in the aristocratic societies of contemporary Christendom.

The Ottoman Empire, besides being a dangerous enemy, also exercised a powerful fascination. The disaffected and the ambitious were attracted by Ottoman opportunity and tolerance; downtrodden peasants looked hopefully to the enemies of their masters—even Martin Luther, in his 'Admonition to prayer against the Turk', published in 1541, gives warning that the poor, oppressed

[1] For some characteristic examples, see M. Leo, *La Bulgarie et son peuple sous la domination ottomane tels que les ont vus les voyageurs anglo-saxons (1586–1878)* (Sofia, 1949), pp. 135ff.

by greedy princes, landlords, and burghers, might well prefer to live under the Turks rather than under Christians such as these.[1] The chivalry of Europe fought bravely against the Turks—but their peasants had little interest in their victory. Even the defenders of the established order were impressed by the political and military efficiency of the Turkish Empire. A large proportion of the vast literature produced in Europe on the Turkish menace is concerned with the merits of the Turkish order, and the wisdom of imitating it.

Though it was not realized at the time, the victories of Sulaymān the Magnificent were the high-water mark of the Turkish tide. The Ottoman armies withdrew from Vienna, the Ottoman fleets from the Indian Ocean. For some time the imposing façade of Ottoman military might concealed the real decline of Ottoman power; in Hungary, Turks and Christians fought a long and inconclusive war, and in 1683 the Turks could even make a second attempt to capture Vienna. But it was too late, and this time the Ottoman defeat was final and decisive. Instead of the strength, it was now the weakness of the Ottoman state that posed a problem to Europe. That problem was known as the Eastern Question.

In some parts of the world, notably in tropical Africa and South-East Asia, the power and faith of Islam continued to advance. In the West, however, they encountered a decisive reverse, which the victories of the Ottomans had for a while obscured and delayed, but not prevented.

The response of European Christendom to the first great *jihād* had been the Reconquest and the Crusades; the response to the second wave of Islamic advance culminated in the great expansion of Europe which has come to be known as imperialism (for a consideration of how this wave of imperialism coloured European attitudes towards Islam, especially in the nineteenth century, see above, Chapter I, pp. 51 ff.). It began, naturally enough, at the two

[1] *Vermanunge zum Gebet wider den Türcken*, cited by K. M. Setton, 'Lutheranism and the Turkish Peril', in *Balkan Studies*, iii (Salonica, 1962), 161; cf. Dorothy Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk; a Pattern of Alliances 1350–1700* (Liverpool, 1954), pp. 25 ff., 155 ff.

extremities of Europe, in countries which had themselves been subject to Muslim rule—in the Iberian peninsula and in Russia. It spread until it engulfed almost the whole world of Islam.

The great migrations of the Turks had only touched North Africa, and never reached Spain. The effects of Turkish hegemony in the far west of Islam were therefore small. A similar role was, however, played by another people, the Berbers. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Berbers of Africa, like the steppe-peoples of Asia, swept aside the faltering regimes of the established Islamic states, and set up a new political and religious order. The martial prowess and militant piety of the Berbers, like that of the Turks, made it possible for their leaders to create new and powerful states, and to resume the *jihād* with renewed fervour. Their power soon spilled over from Africa to Spain, where for a while it halted the advance of the Christian reconquest.

But only for a while. In the West there were no further infusions of strength, no renovation of political and military structures like that of the Mongol regimes. The Berbers, once settled in the cities, soon lost their ardour, and the decline of Muslim power was resumed. In 1492 the last centre of Muslim power in Spain was conquered by the armies of the Catholic monarchs. In the meantime, the European counter-stroke had already begun.

The Portuguese had completed their reconquest by 1267, almost two and a half centuries before Spain. In 1415, with the capture of Ceuta, they carried the war into the enemy camp, and during the fifteenth century made a determined effort to establish themselves in Morocco, briefly occupying Casablanca and Tangier. The Portuguese attempt at expansion on the North African mainland ended with the victory of the Moroccans at the battle of al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr, in 1578. The Spaniards, too, in the impetus of reconquest, followed their defeated Muslim enemies from Europe to Africa, and between 1497 and 1510 captured a series of towns on the North African coast, from Melilla as far east as Tripoli. This enterprise, too, came to nothing. The Spanish purpose was limited and precautionary—to discourage any attempt at a Muslim restora-

tion, and to protect their shores and ships from Muslim corsairs. With the rise of Ottoman naval power in the Mediterranean, the Spaniards abandoned any serious attempt to invade North Africa, and like the Portuguese were content to hold a few strongpoints with small garrisons.

The real counter-blow of the West against the East came in quite another direction. When Vasco da Gama arrived in Calicut, he explained that he came in search of Christians and spices. It was a fair summary of the motives that sent the Portuguese to Asia—as indeed also, suitably adjusted, of the *jihād* to which, in a sense, their voyages were a long-delayed reply. The sentiment of religious mission was very strong among the Portuguese who went to the East. The voyages of discovery were seen as a religious struggle —a continuation of the Reconquest and the Crusades, and against the same Islamic enemy. When the Portuguese arrived in Eastern waters it was the Muslim powers of Egypt, Turkey, Persia, and India who were their opponents, and whose hegemony they overthrew. After the Portuguese came the Spaniards, the French, the English, and the Dutch, who between them established a West European supremacy in Africa and Southern Asia that lasted until the twentieth century.

The same pattern of recovery, reconquest, and counter-attack can be seen in the other European country conquered by Islam in the Middle Ages—that is, in Russia. The Muslim domination of Russia, in the time of the Golden Horde, was of briefer duration and more limited effect than Moorish rule in Spain. Nevertheless, like the *Turkokratia* in Greece and the Moorish dominion in Spain, the 'Tatar yoke' left a profound mark on the Russian memory. So too did the struggle to end it.

The Russian recovery began in the last quarter of the fourteenth century. In 1380 Dimitri Donskoy, grand-prince of Moscow, defeated the Tatars in a pitched battle at Kulikovo field. This victory, though celebrated in Russian history and legend, was not decisive, for two years later the Tatars rode north again, devastated the Russian lands, and captured Moscow, where they reimposed

the tribute. A more deadly blow to the power of the Golden Horde was dealt by a new conqueror from the East, the famous Timur or Tamerlane, who attacked and defeated them in 1395. During the fifteenth century the Khanate of the Golden Horde broke up. Its dominions were split between the three rival Khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea, as well as other independent groups in the steppes east of the Volga and of the Urals.

These divisions allowed Ivan the Great of Moscow to free himself, in 1480, from all tribute and dependence. Like the Spaniards and Portuguese, but with far greater success, the Russians set out to pursue their former masters. After a long and hard struggle against the Volga Tatars, the Russians finally captured Kazan in 1552. This was the decisive victory. With Kazan in their hands, it was a comparatively easy task to advance right down the Volga and seize Astrakhan in 1556. With this victory, the Russians controlled the Volga trade route, and had reached the Caspian. The stage was set for the great Russian advances in Asia.

While the maritime powers of Western Europe sailed round Africa and established themselves in Southern and South-Eastern Asia, the Russians advanced overland—to the Black Sea, the Caspian, the Pamir, and the Pacific—and incorporated the Muslim peoples of the Crimea, Daghistan, northern Azerbaijan, the Volga, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia in their far-flung domains.

The Russian and West European expansion into Asia and Africa was helped by a substantial superiority in arms. The Russians encountered no major power in their way eastwards; the maritime empires, with ships built to withstand the Atlantic gales and fight one another, had an advantage in navigational skill and naval armament which no Asian country could equal. Only in Europe did the Ottoman Empire, even in its decline still the most powerful of all the Muslim states, stubbornly resist the advance of Christian Europe towards the Balkans, the Aegean, and Constantinople.

In 1606, after an inconclusive war, the Ottomans and Austrians signed a treaty of peace at Sitvatorok, on the banks of a stream on the border between the two Empires. This treaty was a turning-

point. For the first time the war was ended, not by a truce dictated in Istanbul by the victor to the vanquished, but by a treaty, negotiated between the parties, and signed between equals on the frontier. In this treaty, for the first time, the Habsburg monarch is no longer called the 'King of Vienna', as in early Turkish documents, but is graced with the imperial title.

The seventeenth century began with a concession of equality; it ended with an admission of defeat. The second failure at Vienna, and the headlong Turkish retreat that followed it, meant a clear and unmistakable victory for the Austrians and their allies. The treaty of Carlowitz, of 1699, was the first signed by Turkey as a defeated power; it was also the first in which the Turkish ministers sought the good offices of friendly governments in the West, to mitigate by diplomatic means the consequences of military failure. The Turks were forgetting the strategy of the Holy War; they were learning the politics of survival, and the new art of diplomacy.

The art of diplomacy was in itself no novelty to the Muslims. The Prophet himself had received and dispatched envoys, and the practice was followed by the Caliphs and other Muslim rulers. From Crusading times onwards, envoys from Christian Europe were frequent visitors at Muslim courts. The practice and purposes of diplomacy were, however, from the Muslim side, limited. There were no permanent, resident embassies, until European states, from the sixteenth century onwards, began to set them up in Istanbul. The Ottomans made no attempt to establish permanent embassies in Europe until the end of the eighteenth century—other Muslim states even later. Instead, they preferred to rely, for the necessary minimum dealings with infidel governments, on occasional special missions sent to one or another European country, and on the European envoys in their own capital. The main purpose of such exchanges was commercial; there was indeed little else to discuss. Political conflicts were resolved by war, and the solution determined by the victor. Other political relationships between Muslims and non-tributary Christian states were to be kept to the indispensable minimum—and even that was very

largely left in the care of non-Muslim officials of Muslim states. The much-discussed 'alliance' between Francis I of France and Sulaymān the Magnificent existed largely in the European imagination. On the Turkish side, there was no more than a limited tactical co-operation, which has an appropriately limited place in Turkish historiography.

The negotiation of the treaty of Carlowitz, in which the penalties of defeat were alleviated through the diplomatic skill of the British and Dutch envoys, gave the Turkish government their first insight into the scope and possibilities of international diplomacy. Even after this lesson, however, progress was slow. Curiosity about Europe was still very limited, and dealings with European diplomats still entrusted to the chief Dragoman of the Sublime Porte, who was a Greek. Not until the end of the eighteenth century did the Ottoman Empire sign treaties of alliance with Christian powers. Turkey was at war with Russia and Austria; Sweden too was at war with Russia, joined a little later by Prussia. Treaties with the two countries were accordingly signed in 1789 and 1790. The military judge Shanizade Efendi denounced this innovation of a military alliance with a Christian country as contrary to the Holy Law, citing the Koranic verse: 'O you who believe! Do not take My enemies and your enemies as friends!' (lx. 1). He was over-ruled by the Chief Mufti, who cited the tradition that 'God will help the cause of Islam with men who are not of it'.[1]

During the eighteenth century there had been some improvement in Turkish fortunes. By the treaty of Passarovitz of 1718, Turkey was compelled to cede some further territories. Thereafter, thanks largely to the dissensions of her enemies, she was able to recover some ground. But the improvement was of brief duration. In 1768 war broke out with Russia, and after a series of military and naval defeats, Turkey was compelled to sign the treaty of Küchük Kaynarja of 1774, in which, among other provisions, the

[1] Jevdet, *Tārikh* (Istanbul, 1309/1891–2), v. 12; cf. T. Naff, 'Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789–1807', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, lxxxiii (1963), 310.

Sultan renounced his ancient suzerainty over the Crimean Tatars, who became 'independent', and conceded to the Russian Empress a right to protect the Russian Church in Istanbul which grew into a virtual protectorate over his own orthodox Christian subjects. In compensation the Sultan was allowed to exert religious authority, as 'supreme Muhammadan Caliph', over the Crimean Muslims. This was a meaningless phrase, which was in any case forgotten when the Russians annexed the Crimea a few years later. It did, however, give rise to some rather remarkable consequences within the Islamic world.

The authentic Islamic Caliphate had been dead for many centuries. The Ottoman Sultan had indeed used the title Caliph—but so had many other Muslim sovereigns, including some very minor ones. In the usage of the time, Caliph was one of the numerous titles used by a Muslim sovereign within his own boundaries. No sovereign claimed or exercised any religious authority beyond his boundaries, and no such authority was known or recognized in the Islamic world. The claim to religious jurisdiction over the Crimean Tatars incorporated in the treaty of Küchük Kaynarja was partly a device to save the Sultan's face, partly a forlorn attempt to preserve some link with the Crimea—the first genuinely Muslim country that the Sultan had been compelled to abandon. Earlier cessions had been of Christian lands, with no more than a small ruling minority of Muslims. The Crimea was old Muslim territory, with a Muslim population. Its loss was a bitter blow.

It was also the first of a long series of similar blows, which brought vast areas of the Islamic world under Christian rule, and left only two Muslim sovereigns reigning over independent states of any size. Of these two, the Shah of Persia was a Shī'ī. It was natural that Sunnīs everywhere, deprived of their own leaders, should look towards the last great Sunnī Sultan for guidance.

The theory of the Ottoman Caliphate, first suggested in the treaty of Küchük Kaynarja, was supported a few years later with a new argument—the story that the last 'Abbāsid Caliph in Cairo had transferred the Caliphate to the Ottoman conqueror of Egypt,

Selim I. This, it was argued, had brought the Islamic Caliphate to the house of Osman, who had retained it ever since.

The story of the transfer is an obvious myth, and the Ottoman claim to the Caliphate received little support during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. From the mid nineteenth century onwards, however, Ottoman claims were propounded with increasing vigour, and received a growing measure of acceptance, especially in Russian Central Asia and British India. The Ottoman Caliphate, and the pan-Islamic movement associated with it, served to rally Muslim morale during this period of West and East European domination.

The Ottoman Caliphate was finally abolished by the Turkish Republic in 1924, and various attempts to create a new Caliphate have come to nothing. In the meantime, the confrontation between Islam and Christendom has taken new forms—very different in the areas of West and of East European domination. Western Europe, through a failure of will, faith, and finally power, has relinquished its hold on those parts of the Muslim world which it ruled. Some economic and cultural influences remain—though even these are dwindling; political and military influences have almost completely disappeared. Eastern Europe on the other hand has not only maintained but has strengthened its grip, and extended it to new areas; no longer Christian, it has found another creed, militant and proselytizing, with which to challenge the ideas and values and standards of Islam.

For the first time in centuries, the greater part of the Islamic world consists of independent states, whose rulers have a real chance to choose between alternatives. The future of Islam, and of much else besides, will depend on the choice that they make.

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